| article |
| Between Technological Society and Ecological Culture |
| Between Technological Society and Ecological Culture Eastasian Conference of STS, 11-13 May 2001 Jongduck Choi(Sangji University) and Sangha Lee(Korea University) A choice is normally dependent on situations. A choice situation and an agent’s motives are interwoven with each other. And his motives are rooted in traditional customs, social structures, and the present scientific-technological standards, etc., which all construct his world view. Someone might try to find a rational choice criterion without considering agent’s motives. But such a trial is comparable to the man claiming that he has 200 million dollars in a heavenly bank. An agent’s world view cannot be ignored in a choice situation, as a real bank cannot be a heavenly bank. Now, let agents be various cultural groups. Some dominant groups might easily exercise their privilege in the present economic global process, whereby cultural conflicts cannot be avoidable. The result of such conflicts is a cultural conservatism which is not suitable for the scientific-technological world. All groups want to be co-evolutionary. A necessary condition for cultural co-evolution is a comparative studies not based on external observable similarities between cultural groups, but on similarities and dissimilarities in the views of nature. Therefore, our cognition of the differences between the Western and traditional East-Asian thought on nature can really aim for an inter-cultural communication and consolidation. And we have to be against 1. Various modes of conflict in the scientific-technological era We say and hear that we are living in a scientific-technological world. How can this world be understood? We cannot define the meaning of the terms ‘scientific’ and ‘technological’ exactly. However, there must be some peculiarities attributable to our scientific-technological era. Two main peculiarities have been often pointed out by theoreticians. One is that the traditional distinction between science and technology or between theoretical knowledge and technological knowledge, held since Aristotle, can be seriously scrutinized. The other is that the value neutrality of science and technology cannot be accepted, because the scientific-technological world is on the one hand very dangerous and on the other hand needs new norms in human social activities. These two peculiarities are not the main focus of this short article. We rather point out the following peculiarities which have not been dealt with seriously in recent times: 1. the intrinsic conflicts inside various scientific theories 2. the cultural conflicts caused by various scientific-technological standards Let us analyse the above two kinds of conflicts. In order to understand the first kind of conflict, we should not regard a somewhat well established scientific theory merely as a formal representation. For example, Newtonian absoluteness of space and time was not something verifiable or refutable by observed facts, but a metaphysical presupposition. Therefore, a philosophical understanding of nature or a world view is implicit in a scientific theory. We now live in a house of various scientific theories, hence in various world views, even if we all are not explicitly conscious of this fact. Not all world views are compatible and coherent with each other. The methodological approach of molecular biology and the philosophical picture of modern immunology are so different that integrating them into one view is not probable. Their conflicts, based on the differences between molecular reductionism and evolutionary thought, go back to the late 19th century debates between humorlists and E. Metchnikoff. The intrinsic conflicts inside various scientific theories did not explicitly appear in the past in which the traditional scientific world view was dominant. This kind of conflict can be nowadays extended to the cultural domain. For example, East-Asian and Western medicine are both now practiced in Korea, whereby Korean medicine cannot exercise its traditional privilege. Western medicine was not accessible to ordinary people in traditional East-Asian culture, as the East-asian medicine was unknown to Western people. The second kind of conflict is the cultural conflict caused by various scientific- technological standards, as DNA testing in criminal cases. This kind of conflict is somewhat different from the first kind. We have developed or are developing various scientific-technological standards applicable to actual choice situations, for example to technological assessment. Various scientific-technological standards are potentially applicable with respect to one choice situation. However, only one such standard will be selected normally, whereby a dominant science plays an important role. An important question is by which factors the dominance of competing scientific theories will be defined with respect to a choice situation. Scientific objectivity cannot be the only criterion for resolving the question because of the intrinsic conflicts inside various scientific theories. Economic and political factors rather play an important role in making a scientific-technological standard. Application of such a new standard in a society is a highly complex process in which tradition and modernity could conflict with each other. The system of cultural groups is not homogeneous with respect to their own traits and scientific-technological levels. Thus, the cultural conflicts caused by scientific-technological standards are a world wide problem. Some such standards developed by Western civilization are totally alien to the East-Asian or African culture, largely unnoticed because of its subordinate position in the world market. Metaphorically speaking, many Western dog-lovers hate dog-eaters and call for a world wide prohibition of dog-eating. Consider why the amputation of one arm in the case of car accidents receives the highest compensation money. The reason for it lies in the efficiency of bodily parts in working. That reason might not be fully understood by the people living in inner Mongolia. In some cases, a cultural group is not yet rationally skilled to use certain scientific-technological standards proposed by Western countries. 2. Qualification for world disaster We remarked about various modes of cultural conflict in the scientific- technological era. Such conflicts are not avoidable in a sense. Who then is qualified to harmonize various cultural groups? It is very difficult to find some rational criteria for that qualification. So, let us ask a satirical question: who is qualified to bring disorder or disaster to the world cultural system? We will not directly designate certain nations, but a type of theoretician or leader etc., the so-called ‘universalists’ who think as follows: 1. Science and technology are only relevant to cultural factors when they are regulated by some social institutions and norms or when we need them to restrict the process of scientific-technological development; 2. There is or might be a universally valid system of cultural values which rational agents in the end will find. Not only most theoreticians in the period of enlightenment, but also several important current philosophers and activists as J. Habermas, Fukuyama, etc. are regarded as universalists. According to the universalist‘s view, some groups should be subordinated to a rational system of values founded newly in the scientific-technological era, because they are not prepared to participate in rational discourse or too thick-headed to accept it. It is not a surprising fact that the concept of culture played an important role in justifying colonialism. Even if universalists accept universal human rights, their concept of culture could be easily misused to justify cultural discrimination. No wonder that many theoreticians in the period of enlightenment shared the following standpoint: Those born among a barbarous people have really only ideas relating to their self-preservation. … A proof that they lack ideas is that their languages are all very sterile; not only have they few words, but they have few modes of conceiving and sensing. The fibres of their brains, being little used to being flexed, have become rigid.” Universalists are surely good utopians but like so-called ‘lawyers without practice’. Culture is an open and dynamic system. Science and technology cannot be separable from a cultural evolution. For example, a calendar system reflects the cosmological world view, symbols, and technological status of a cultural group. Of course, someone might object, claiming that we all now use the Julian calender system, refrigerators, and personal computers. But the methods of using them are different with respect to various cultural groups. The refrigerators in our land are equipped with particular vessels preserving Korean traditional dishes, which could reciprocally develop a new technology. Science and technology evolve with culture, and conversely. Traditional cultural traits are newly transformed or soak into our scientific-technological era. Not all scientific-technological standards developed by the Western countries are fully transformed into the East-Asian cultural groups. However, those groups are culturally unnoticed by Western countries. Cultural conflicts are here and there. No wonder that the discourse on East-Asian identity has been the center of attention with respect to the problem of cultural conflicts. We should not be universalists in order to co-evolve together or solve the kinds of conflicts remarked in the previous paragraph. We should at first find out the peculiarity and originality of each cultural group largely unnoticed by the Western countries. For a fair game, it may be necessary to check out cultural conflicts in the perspectives of those groups. 3. For a fair game principle We are conscious of the fact that there have been other trends such as vitalism in the Western view of nature. But we don’t think that they played an important role in the formation of the present scientific-technological world. We are also conscious of the fact that the traditional East-Asian view of nature cannot be in itself transformed into the modern East-Asian cultural group. The world cultural system is not closed and fixed, whereby the traits of the unnoticed cultural groups cannot be fully coated by those of some dominant groups. Our motive in the previous comparison of the views of nature is not based on the universalist’s view, just on a fair game principle by which cultural conflicts should be seriously reconsidered in the perspective of the groups largely subordinated to the order developed by the dominant groups in the world cultural system. A fair game principle aims at a deep understanding of differences between various cultural traits in order to find shared goals and evaluative standards. We have to ask the question how western theoreticians can dialectically engage eastern thought, and vice versa, for cultural co-evolution. A common understanding of the philosophical enterprise may or may not be attainable. However, to organize eastern human studies by means of western philosophical categories and to evaluate it by western criteria of evidence, argument and proof is idle as it is parochial. Likewise, it would be absurd to explain modern scientific thinking with the eastern philosophy, despite the dissatisfaction with a western mechanical world view. Baird Callicott/Roger T. Ames(ed.), Nature, SUNY, 1989 Jongduck Choi, Die Ontologische Interpretation in der Quantenmechnik, Giessen, 1993 C.F. Getmann: “Technikfolgen-Abschaetzung: Konzeption in überblick” Europaeische Akademie zur Forschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklung, Bad Neuen-Ahrweiler GmbH, 1996 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York ; Borchardt, 1996 H.Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung.- Versuch einer Ethik für die Technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt, 1979 C. Montesquieu, De Secondat, Paris: Editions du Seuil 1964 Harald Müller, Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen, Frankfurt.a.M ; Fischer Verlag, 1999 Harold H. Oliver, A Relational Metaphysic, Nijhoff, 1981 |